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A Place of Their Own: Crowds in the New 
Market for Equity Crowdfunding 
Seth C. Oranburg† 
Crowdsourcing’s limits are determined by people’s passion 
and imagination, which is to say, there aren’t any limits at all. 
– Jeff Howe 
INTRODUCTION 
Is small better than large? When it comes to normative 
business law policy, many seem to think so. Many scholars 
attribute the 2007–08 financial crisis to mis-regulation of large 
banks. Many others attribute the subsequent economic 
recovery to jobs created by small businesses. While the “99%” 
protested big banks on Wall Street, the “Startup America” 
grassroots campaign for small business garnered political 
support for corporate-finance legislation. Within a two-year 
period, Congress passed the JOBS Act1—which tripled private 
company shareholder limits,2 authorized federal equity 
crowdfunding,3 and created the “mini-IPO” Regulation A+4—
and the Dodd-Frank Act5—which seeks to end “too big to fail” 
by imposing a multitude of requirements on large firms.6 In 
other words, policymakers seem to be trying to encourage the 
smallest firms while discouraging the biggest ones. But this 
policy decision seems to ignore the fact that all large firms were 
 
 † Assistant Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law. 
Copyright © 2016 by Seth C. Oranburg. 
 1. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 
306 (2011) [hereinafter “JOBS Act”]; Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,388 (Nov. 
16, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249, 269, and 
274). 
 2. JOBS Act, Title II. 
 3. JOBS Act, Title III. 
 4. JOBS Act, Title IV. 
 5. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (Dodd Frank Act was enacted after being 
signed by the President on July 21, 2010). 
 6. Id. 
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once startups that have elected to “go public” because they 
determined that the benefits of being public outweighed the 
costs of public-company regulations. The nature of corporate 
and securities regulation forces startups to stay small and 
private in order to avoid onerous public-company regulations, 
which actually limits the government’s ability to protect 
investors. 
I call this contradictory policy phenomenon “Too Small To 
Succeed.” In future work, I will develop a unified theory of “Too 
Small To Succeed” regulations—which are reflected in many 
private-law regulations that have accrued since the recent 
financial crises—and analyze their unintended consequences. 
But, for the instant purposes of this Essay, I will restrict this 
exploration insofar as it pertains to the regulation of online 
equity crowdfunding, whereby ordinary Americans will be able 
to invest in startups that are not yet publicly traded.7 The law 
is intended to encourage the development of startups and to 
allow more Americans to profit from investing in them. But this 
rosy picture may not come to pass because too many of the 
traditional investor-protection provisions, that are popular with 
the too-big-to-fail policymakers, ultimately made their way into 
the federal crowdfunding law. As a result, a rapid rise of the 
Digital Shareholder is unlikely. Instead, a more likely outcome 
is that startups and investors will quickly realize that federal 
crowdfunding in its present form is too small to succeed. 
This Essay will discuss how one specific instance of the 
“Too Small To Succeed” phenomenon resulted in policies that 
may impede or inhibit equity crowdfunding. The investors in 
online equity crowdfunding—who Professor Andrew Schwartz 
terms “Digital Shareholders”8—must create large networks in 
order to operate efficiently. Policies must leverage the unique 
characteristics of these Digital Shareholders; otherwise, as 
Professor Darian Ibrahim argues, equity crowdfunding may 
devolve into a “Market for Lemons.”9 
I.  DIGITAL SHAREHOLDERS 
Professors Ibrahim and Schwartz both begin their 
 
 7. JOBS Act, Title III. 
 8. Andrew A. Schwartz, The Digital Shareholder, 100 MINN. L. REV. 609, 
679 (2016). 
 9. Darian M. Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding: A Market for Lemons?, 100 
MINN. L. REV. 561 (2016). 
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inquiries on the vitality of federal crowdfunding with a 
discussion of the well-recognized “trio of problems” in 
entrepreneurial finance as developed by Professor Ronald 
Gilson and others.10 In short, startup investors have three 
economic problems, which professional and public-company 
investors can generally mitigate, but Digital Shareholders 
might not be able to avoid. First, there is an information 
asymmetry problem: entrepreneurs know more than investors 
about what entrepreneurs will do,11 which is why professional 
investors join the board and oversee the entrepreneurs.12 
Second, there is great uncertainty as to whether the venture 
will succeed,13 so professional investors invest in stages, over 
time.14 Third, there are agency costs (specifically, residual 
loss);15 entrepreneurs have incentives to shirk and self-deal,16 
especially when the investor does not understand the 
entrepreneurs’ technology,17 so professionals generally invest in 
familiar technical areas.18 These problems and their solutions 
 
 10. Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from 
the American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1076 (2003); see Robert P. 
Bartlett, III, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the False Dichotomy of the 
Corporation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 37, 41 n.9 (2006) (“This model . . . can be found 
in virtually any academic discussion . . . .”). 
 11. See, e.g., Adrian Chiang, How Entrepreneurs Can Crowdfund 
Renewable Energy Projects, 8 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 659, 683 
(2015). 
 12. NOAM WASSERMAN, THE FOUNDER’S DILEMMAS: ANTICIPATING AND 
AVOIDING THE PITFALLS THAT CAN SINK A STARTUP 145 (2012). 
 13. See Chiang, supra note 11, at 683. 
 14. WASSERMAN, supra note 12, at 145; Startup Financing, in STARTUP 
CREATION FOR THE SMART ECO-EFFICIENT BUILT ENVIRONMENT (F. Pacheco 
Torgal ed., 2016). 
 15. Residual losses are agency costs resulting from divergent interests  
of principals and agents that persist even when principals expend  
effort to monitor and bond the agent. See Jay B. Kesten, Managerial 
Entrenchment and Shareholder Wealth Revisited: Theory and Evidence from a 
Recessionary Financial Market, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1609 (2010). 
 16. See Agency Costs, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/ 
terms/a/agencycosts.asp (last visited Aug. 13, 2016). 
 17. American Experience: Henry Ford (PBS television broadcast Jan.  
29, 2013), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/transcript/ 
henryford-transcript/ (“His investors want to make an expensive car to sell to 
wealthy people. Ford disagrees fundamentally. He wants to create a car for 
the people. . . . He’s trying to perfect an invention. In order to keep doing the 
trial runs and get it better, it’s going to take a lot of capital to keep testing, 
keep testing. . . . Narrator: Finally realizing they were being duped, his 
backers pulled the plug.”). 
 18. Venture Capital, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., http://www.sba.gov/ 
content/venture-capital (last visited Aug. 13, 2016). 
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are interrelated (e.g., staged financing addresses both 
uncertainty and shirking), and these strategies have been 
formalized in the standard forms for venture capital 
financing.19 
The Digital Shareholder probably cannot mitigate the trio 
of problems in the traditional ways. Given a legal limit of 
$10,000 per investor per year, it is doubtful that the digital 
shareholder will have the time, inclination, or ability to join 
two or three corporate boards, manage a multi-staged private-
investment portfolio, and get technical expertise in the latest 
app-coding languages. 
In addition, crowdfunding theoretically has the additional 
problem of competition with professional investment.20 The 
most promising startups receive multiple offers from the most 
prominent venture-capital investors, who contribute not only 
money but also professional services, work space, mentorship, 
advice, management, and, of course, access to yet more money. 
Offline, nodes of well-connected venture capitalists (VCs) with 
MBAs from Stanford share information about leads over lattes 
in Palo Alto. They meet founders daily, and their financial 
resources are virtually unlimited. Their associates process data 
from expensive, manicured databases21 into custom analytics 
reports, fine-tuned to each principal’s predilections.22 The 
Digital Shareholder, on the other hand, goes to 
Crowdfunder.com and clicks “Search.” Can Digital 
Shareholders—who are by definition amateurs—compete with 
investment professionals in finding, acquiring, servicing, and 
monitoring the best investment opportunities? 
This picture may seem pretty bleak, but Professor 
Schwartz identifies five novel solutions that the Digital 
Shareholder may employ to solve the trio of problems: (1) the 
wisdom of the crowd,23 (2) the crowdsourcing of information,24 
 
 19. NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, MODEL LEGAL DOCUMENTS, http:// 
nvca.org/resources/model-legal-documents/ (last visited Aug. 13, 2016). 
 20. In other work I have explained how crowdfunding and venture capital 
could be engineered to work in tandem. See Seth C. Oranburg, Bridgefunding: 
Crowdfunding and the Market for Entrepreneurial Finance, 25 CORNELL J. L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 397 (2015). 
 21. Some of the research tools that professional investors use include 
PitchBook, CapitalIQ, Option Impact, and SharkRepellant. 
 22. ASKIVY, Role Descriptions in Venture Capital (VC), http://www.askivy 
.net/articles/venture-capital/venture-capital-explained/role-descriptions-in-
venture-capital (last visited Aug. 13, 2016). 
 23. Schwartz, supra note 8, Part IV.A. 
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(3) online reputation,25 (4) securities-based compensation,26 and 
(5) digital monitoring.27 These Digital Shareholder strategies 
may come into play both during the campaign and after the 
company receives the money. 
While Professor Schwartz’s solutions are theoretically 
sound, there is a practical problem to their implementation: all 
of these solutions require operations on a large scale, and the 
federal law is specifically designed to limit federal 
crowdfunding to a small scale. Therefore, without modification 
to the federal law, Professor Schwartz’s solutions cannot be 
effectively used by the Digital Shareholder. Additionally, some 
of the heuristic behaviors that Digital Shareholders may use to 
make investment decisions may be problematic themselves. 
A. THE WISDOM OF CROWDFUNDING 
Professor Schwartz rightly points out that “[a] well-
established body of scientific literature shows that groups are 
better at finding facts and making predictions than lone 
individuals, even experts.”28 But the wisdom of crowds is only 
expressed where crowds can grow sufficiently large,29 evaluate 
information that can be perfectly known,30 or are organized 
around a thought leader.31 Currently, our securities laws seem 
to preclude these features, making it difficult for crowdfunding 
to converge on wise decisions. Instead, our securities laws seem 
more likely to encourage herding behavior, which is the key 
inefficiency that arises within crowds.32 
 
 24. Id. at Part IV.B. 
 25. Id. at Part IV.C. 
 26. Id. at Part IV.D. 
 27. Id. at Part IV.E. 
 28. Id. at 659 (citing JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: HOW 
THE MANY ARE SMARTER THAN THE FEW AND HOW COLLECTIVE WISDOM 
SHAPES BUSINESS, ECONOMIES, SOCIETIES AND NATIONS 31 (2004)) (“[A] large 
group of diverse individuals will come up with better and more robust 
forecasts and make more intelligent decisions than even the most skilled 
[individual acting alone].”); Karsten Hueffer et al., The Wisdom of Crowds: 
Predicting a Weather and Climate-Related Event, 8 JUDGMENT & DECISION 
MAKING 91, 91 (Mar. 2013). For crowdfunding, where investors will have to 
gauge the future performance of various startup companies, predictions will be 
more important than fact-finding. 
 29. Schwartz, supra note 8, at 659. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Ilan Lobel & Evan Sadler, Information Diffusion in Networks through 
Social Learning, 10 THEORETICAL ECON. 807, 808 (2015) (“According to the 
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Crowd Science, also known as “Citizen Science,” explains 
that groups of people (such as Digital Shareholders in 
crowdfunding) convey information to each other through their 
behaviors.33 This is the colloquially called “wisdom of the 
crowd.” When one member of a group witnesses the behavior of 
another, the first member may assume the second member is 
acting on information that is private to that second member. 
The first member, who may also have some private 
information, may infer the second member’s private 
information from the action that is observed. The first actor 
may then take a similar action based both on private 
information and inferred information. 
A familiar example makes this theory clear. When a person 
decides to watch a video on a web site like YouTube, that 
person can see how many others have watched that video, 
which suggests something about the quality of that video. That 
person may decide to watch the most-watched video because 
the group information suggests that video is the highest 
quality.34 
This may seem quite innocuous, but as the crowd gets 
larger, the information from crowd behavior begins to 
overwhelm the actor’s private information. The extreme form of 
this group-think behavior is called an “information cascade,” 
where even rational individuals will choose to abandon their 
private information (or not make efforts to gather private 
information in the first place) and instead to follow the crowd.35 
In this case, the wisdom of the crowd can be sublimated into 
herd behavior. 
Crowd science theory deems a crowd “successful” when it 
“aggregates” “asymptotic information.” In other words, from a 
systems-sciences perspective, a “wise” crowd is one that 
efficiently produces and distributes unique information about 
the true state of the world. 
 
last two decades of economics scholarship, herding is the key inefficiency that 
arises in social learning models.”). 
 33. Eric Hand, Citizen Science: People Power, 466 NATURE 685, 685–87 
(2010). 
 34. R. Crane and D. Sornette, Viral, Quality, and Junk Videos on 
YouTube: Separating Content From Noise in an Information Rich 
Environment, AAAI (2008), https://www.aaai.org/Papers/Symposia/Spring/ 
2008/SS-08-06/SS08-06-004.pdf. 
 35. DAVID EASLEY & JON KLEINBERG, NETWORKS, CROWDS, AND 
MARKETS: REASONING ABOUT A HIGHLY CONNECTED WORLD 6 (2010). 
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Crowd science literature offers empirical findings about the 
wisdom of crowds. Data shows that the wisdom of crowds 
converges on an accurate decision as the size of the crowd 
becomes arbitrarily large.36 In other words, larger networks 
make better decisions. Unfortunately for equity crowdfunding, 
the initial network size is zero, and government regulations 
will likely keep federal equity crowdfunding small.37 
In crowd-science talk, individual beliefs are “bounded” 
when no one individual has certainty as to the right answer, 
and they are “unbounded” when some members have absolute 
certainty about the true state of the world. Of course, few 
things we might want to ask of crowds are as binary and 
obviously knowable as 0 or 1. Infinitely unbounded beliefs are 
an assumption some crowd scientists make, but no human 
opinion is ever truly knowable and correct in an absolute sense. 
Knowledge of which crowdfunding company is worth 
investing in cannot be absolutely certain, so assuming bounded 
beliefs seem to better reflect the reality of crowdfunding. 
When beliefs are bounded, there may be a problem called 
“herding” or “information cascades.” Herding is when 
individuals merely mimic others’ actions, ignoring their own 
private information, as opposed to “learning aggregation,” when 
the crowd converges on the right result by leveraging both 
public and private information.38 
More recent studies have determined that social networks 
within crowds can improve information aggregation and lead to 
asymptotic learning where there are “influential agents” or 
“information leaders,” so long as that agent is not excessively 
influential.39 In other words, when there is an individual amid 
the crowd who is observed by most or all other members of the 
 
 36. Daron Acemoglu et al., Bayesian Learning in Social Networks, 78 REV. 
ECON. STUDS. 1201, 1203 (2011) (“We say that there is asymptotic learning 
[information aggregation] if as the size of the society becomes arbitrarily large, 
equilibrium actions converge (in probability) to the action that yields the 
higher pay-off.”). 
 37. Seth C. Oranburg, Democratizing Startups, 68 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2016). 
 38. Sushil Bikhchandani et al., A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and 
Cultural Change as Information Cascades, 100 J. POL. ECON. 992 (1992); 
Abhijit V. Banerjee, A Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107 Q. J. ECON. 797 
(1992). See also Lones Smith & Peter Sørensen, Pathological Outcomes of 
Observational Learning, 68 ECONOMETRICA 371 (2000). 
 39. Acemoglu, supra note 36, at 1218–19; Lobel & Sadler, supra note 32, 
at 809. 
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crowd as a thought leader, even a relatively small crowd with 
bounded beliefs may exhibit the wisdom of the crowd. 
To summarize this in simpler terms, crowdfunding 
networks seem to have the qualities—namely, small size and 
bounded beliefs—that encourage herding behavior, which is 
inefficient and undesirable. Government policies that keep 
crowd size small are likely to further prevent the wisdom of the 
crowd from discovering the true state of the world (i.e., which 
investments are good and which are bad). 
To alleviate this problem, regulations could allow or even 
encourage crowdfunding networks to grow large. An alternative 
solution, which I have expressly proposed in prior work40 and 
which Professor Ibrahim alludes to in A Market for Lemons,41 is 
to require crowdfunding companies to have an influential 
agent. These modifications to the law will help the Digital 
Shareholder benefit from the wisdom of the crowd. 
B. CROWDSOURCING 
Crowdsourcing—where a group or “crowd” of users 
collaborate to produce information that is beneficial to the 
whole community42—is a more promising ability of the Digital 
Shareholder because, and Professor Schwartz points out, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has expressly 
endorsed the sharing of information about investment 
opportunities among Digital Shareholders.43 But the SEC’s 
endorsement of crowdsourcing44 is mere verbiage unless the 
information networks are structured in a way that facilitates 
information diffusion without causing undesirable information 
cascades. 
 
 40. Oranburg, supra note 37. 
 41. Ibrahim, supra note 9, at 600. 
 42. Anhai Doan, Raghu Ramakrishnan, & Alon Y. HaLevy, 
Crowdsourcing Systems on the World-Wide Web, 54 COMMC’NS OF THE ACM 86 
(Apr. 2011). 
 43. Schwartz, supra note 8, at 663. 
 44. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,388 (Nov. 16, 2015) (to be codified at 
17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239–40, 249) (“Individuals interested in the 
crowdfunding campaign—members of the ‘crowd’—may share information 
about the project, cause, idea or business with each other and use the 
information to decide whether or not to fund the campaign based on the 
collective ‘wisdom of the crowd,’”); id. at 71,547 (Crowdfunding portals may 
“[p]rovide communication channels by which investors can communicate with 
one another and with representatives of the issuer through the funding 
portal’s platform about offerings through the platform . . .”). 
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Professors Lobel and Sadler introduced the metric of 
“diffusion” to the literature on theoretical economics.45 
Previously, social networks were deemed successful when they 
produced “aggregation,” which is when the true state of the 
world is revealed across a whole population.46 Complete 
aggregation does not generally occur in the real world;47 
theories that predict complete aggregation rely on unrealistic 
assumptions of perfect network topology48 or signals of 
unbounded strength.49 On the other hand, diffusion—which is 
when all members of society obtain information such that they 
are able to achieve the same ex ante probability of making a 
good decision as an expert—can be used to evaluate the success 
of networks where strong signal are rare but informative.50 
Applying the theory of diffusion to the SEC’s 
crowdsourcing mandate (as codified in the C.F.R.)51 reveals 
some theoretical concerns about its system design and suggests 
that additional empirical research is needed. The SEC’s system 
design calls for Digital Shareholders to share information with 
each other. Professor Schwartz deals handily with the 
preliminary concerns that shareholders will guard and not 
share their private information: no one shareholder can fund a 
company and so a shareholder who wants a company to succeed 
must inform others about its value; in short, “crowdfunding 
promotes cooperation.”52 
But what is the nature of the information that is 
communicated? The shareholders generating this information 
are legally permitted to invest somewhere between $2500 and 
$5000 per year in all their crowdfunding investments.53 Ideally, 
Digital Shareholders diversify this investment in at least ten to 
twenty separate companies.54 If a shareholder invests only 
 
 45. Lobel & Sadler, supra note 32, at 811. 
 46. EASLEY & KLEINBERG, supra note 35, at 6 (“What we see in these 
figures is a growing awareness and adoption of a new innovation that is visible 
in aggregate, across a whole population.”). 
 47. But see Exodus 19:11 (“And be ready against the third day: for the 
third day the LORD will come down in the sight of all the people upon mount 
Sinai.”). 
 48. Acemoglu, supra note 36, at 1201. 
 49. Smith & Sørensen, supra note 38, at 371. 
 50. Lobel & Sadler, supra note 32, at 807, 809. 
 51. 17 C.F.R. Parts 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 269, and 274 (2016). 
 52. Schwartz, supra note 8, at 666. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Oranburg, supra note 20; Usha Rodrigues, Securities Law’s Dirty 
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about $250 per company, that shareholder is rationally 
motivated to spend no more than $250 in effort to research, 
select, and transmit information about that investment 
opportunity. To put this number in perspective, a stock-market 
analyst who works for an exchange earns about $115,000 per 
year55 and covers about 30 companies,56 which equates to about 
$4000 per company covered. Additionally, a professional 
analyst is generally better trained in analyzing equities than 
an average person who may participate in crowdfunding. 
Accordingly, the signals from shareholders are likely to be 
weak and frequent. Recall that diffusion is most likely to occur 
when signals are strong and infrequent. In the absence of 
aggregation or diffusion, information cascades are likely to 
occur.57 
Professor Schwartz recognizes that “[a]nchoring and 
information cascades like this could undermine the 
effectiveness of crowdsourcing investor information,” although 
he concludes that “there is good reason to think that anchoring 
and information cascades will not be fatal in the context of 
crowdfunding because investors are likely to feel and act 
independent from one another.”58 I tend to disagree with this 
conclusion because shareholders who are investing only about 
$250 per company have no rational reason to expend the effort 
required to think independently and instead will employ 
groupthink heuristics to make investment decisions; however, 
the behavior of crowdfunding investors remains an unsolved 
empirical question that requires further study. Additionally, as 
Professor Schwartz points out, there may be non-pecuniary 
 
Little Secret, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3395–96 (2013). 
 55. Louis Horkan, The Salary of a Stock Market Analyst, HOUSTON 
CHRONICLE: WORK, http://work.chron.com/salary-stock-market-analyst-8556 
.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2016). 
 56. THE VAULT MBA CAREER BIBLE 162 (2005). 
 57. Acemoglu, supra note 36, at 1203 (“The main result of Smith and 
Sorensen is that when each individual observes all past actions and private 
beliefs are unbounded, information will be aggregated and the correct action 
will be chosen asymptotically. In contrast, the results in Bikhchandani, 
Hirshleifer and Welch (1992), Banerjee (1992), and Smith and Sorensen (2000) 
indicate that with bounded beliefs, there will not be asymptotic learning (or 
information aggregation). Instead, as emphasized by Bikhchandani, 
Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) and Banerjee (1992), there will be ‘herding’ or 
‘informational cascades,’ where individuals copy past actions and/or 
completely ignore their own signals.”). 
 58. Schwartz, supra note 8, at 668–69. 
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motivates, such as generating a positive online reputation, that 
may overcome the rational apathy of Digital Shareholders. 
C. NON-PECUNIARY MOTIVATIONS 
Professor Schwartz comprehensively addresses the role of 
online reputation in promoting information sharing in 
crowdfunding networks.59 Additionally, gamification—the use 
of game design elements in non-game contexts60—is an 
additional non-pecuniary motivation that may encourage 
Digital Shareholders to share information. Gamification 
methods create a positive user experience that improves user 
retention and utilization.61 Recent studies have shown that 
gamification works for implantations in commerce,62 sharing,63 
innovation,64 ideation,65 data gathering,66 and other contexts 
related to equity crowdfunding. 
Gamification can facilitate online reputation by “scoring” 
the reputation of users; in fact, there are business-method 
patents to this effect.67 Gamification of reputation has been 
 
 59. Id. at Part IV.C. 
 60. Sebastian Deterding et al., From Game Design Elements to 
Gamefulness: Defining “Gamification,” in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 15TH INT’L 
ACAD. MINDTREK CONF.: ENVISIONING FUTURE MEDIA ENV’TS 9 (2011), 
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2181040. 
 61. Sebastian Deterding et al., Gamification: Using Game-Design 
Elements in Non-Gaming Contexts, in CHI ’11 EXTENDED ABSTRACTS ON 
HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYS. 2425 (2011), http://dl.acm.org/citation 
.cfm?id=1979575. 
 62. Juho Hamari, Transforming Homo Economicus into Homo Ludens: A 
Field Experiment on Gamification in a Utilitarian Peer-To-Peer Trading 
Service, 12 ELEC. COM. RES. APPLICATIONS 236 (2013). 
 63. Markus Montola et al., Applying Game Achievement Systems to 
Enhance User Experience in a Photo Sharing Service, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
13TH INT’L ACAD. MINDTREK CONF.: EVERYDAY LIFE IN THE UBIQUITOUS ERA 
94 (2009), http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1621859.94-97. 
 64. J.H. Jung, Christopher Schneider & Joseph Valacich, Enhancing the 
Motivational Affordance of Information Systems: The Effects of Real-time 
Performance Feedback and Goal Setting in Group Collaboration 
Environments, 56 MGMT SCI. 724 (2010). 
 65. Maximilian Witt, Christian Scheiner & Susanne Robra-Bissantz, 
Gamification of Online Idea Competitions: Insights from an Explorative Case, 
41 Jahrestagung der Gesellschaft für Informatik (October 4–7, 2011). 
 66. Theo Downes-Le Guin et al., Myths and Realities of Respondent 
Engagement in Online Surveys, 54 INT’L J. MKT. RES. 1 (2012). 
 67. Method and System for Managing Domain Specific and Viewer 
Specific Reputation on Online Communities, U.S. Patent No. 20080109245 A1 
(filed Nov. 3, 2007) (issued May 8, 2008), https://www.google.com/patents/ 
US20080109245. 
  
158 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW HEADNOTES [100:147 
 
applied in varied contexts such as encouraging software 
developers to include comments in their code68 and creating 
leaderboards to encourage classroom learning.69 Gamification 
has even been used to attract and retain reliable crowdsourcing 
tasks such as relevance assessment and clustering, which could 
be directly applied to crowdsourcing for the Digital 
Shareholder.70 
In sum, while the SEC does not mandate crowdsourcing, it 
also does not prevent it. So long as there is sufficient 
competition in the market for crowdfunding portals, some 
enterprising portals may employ gamification to encourage 
Digital Shareholders to contribute high-quality efforts to 
investment crowdsourcing, which may indeed help Digital 
Shareholders overcome information asymmetry and agency 
costs in crowdfunding. 
D. INCENTIVES AND MANAGEMENT 
The Digital Shareholder has two additional devices that 
may help crowdfunding succeed. First, Professor Schwartz 
suggests that an entrepreneur who uses crowdfunding should 
promise to “eat its own cooking” by being compensated with the 
same type of security that Digital Shareholders receive.71 
Second, digital monitoring—allowing investors to oversee 
entrepreneurs through an “online chat group” and similar 
means—could also be used to ensure that entrepreneurs do not 
shirk. 
The SEC does not require this. Whether or not 
entrepreneurs, Digital Shareholders, and the other participants 
in the equity-investment ecosystem (venture capitalists and 
angel investors) will prefer this arrangement is essentially an 
empirical question that has not been answered. Until the data 
show these requirements are helpful or necessary as default 
 
 68. Christian Reinhard Prause, Improving the Internal Quality of 
Software through Reputation-based Gamification, (Mar. 21, 2013) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Aachen University), http://citeseerx.ist.psu 
.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.465.7157&rep=rep1&type=pdf. 
 69. Ilaria Caponetto, Jeffrey Earp & Michela Ott, Gamification and 
Education: A Literature Review, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 8TH EUR. CONF. ON 
GAMES-BASED LEARNING 50 (2014). 
 70. Carsten Eickhoff et al., Quality through Flow and Immersion: 
Gamifying Crowdsourced Relevance Assessments, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
35TH INT’L ACM SIGIR CONF. ON RES. AND DEV. IN INFO. RETRIEVAL 871, 
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2348400. 
 71. Schwartz, supra note 8, at 679. 
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provisions, it is not prudent to mandate these arrangements in 
all sales of crowdfunding stock. 
On the other hand, creating a new role for an overseer and 
evaluator of crowdfunding investments—an idea which I 
develop more fully in Democratizing Startups72 and to which 
Professor Ibrahim also alludes to in A Market for Lemons73—
solves many of the information-asymmetry and agency-cost 
problems in crowdfunding while providing precisely the type of 
strong information signal that has been theoretically and 
empirically proven in the crowd science literature to improve 
crowdsourcing outcomes. 
II.  THE EQUITY CROWDFUNDING MARKET 
While the federal law that enables equity crowdfunding 
was passed on April 5, 2012,74 that law simply required the 
SEC to promulgate final rules that allow equity crowdfunding 
to occur.75 The SEC’s final rules just went into effect on May 
16, 2016.76 There is still very little data on how this brand-new 
exemption is functioning, but an analysis of the non-equity 
crowdfunding campaigns that succeeded previously and an 
examination of the equity crowdfunding campaigns that have 
already launched provides several valuable insights into the 
new equity crowdfunding market. 
First, comparing the top 10 crowdfunded campaigns with 
the top 10 venture-backed companies reveals that these 
different modalities of fundraising are used for very different 
purposes. A list of the most successful crowdfunding campaigns 
(as measured by amount raised) consists almost entirely of 
consumer-technology products (e.g., the Pebble smartwatch, the 
Coolest cooler, the World’s Best Travel Jacket, the Pono Music 
Player, the Sondors Electric Bike) and entertainment (e.g., the 
Exploding Kittens video game, the Veronica Mars Movie 
Project, Reading Rainbow, the Super Troopers 2 movie).77 In 
 
 72. Oranburg, supra note 37 (proposing a “private independent analyst” or 
PIA). 
 73. Ibrahim, supra note 9, at 600 (proposing a “Nominated Advisor” or 
NOMAD). 
 74. 17 C.F.R. Parts 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249, 269, and 274 (2016). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Catherine Clifford, Starting May 16, Entrepreneurs Can Raise Money 
in a Whole New Way. Here’s What You Need to Know, ENTREPRENEUR (May 5, 
2016), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/275215. 
 77. Most Successful Crowdfunding Campaigns, CROWDFUNDING BLOG 
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stark contrast, the Wall Street Journal’s second annual 
ranking of the top venture-capital-backed companies shows 
that “investors are chasing after Internet firms.”78 Digital 
Shareholders almost never invest in business-to-business (B2B) 
solutions, which is one of the top investment categories for VCs. 
In fact, “[t]he top three [VC-funded] companies are all business-
product makers: Genband Inc., a supplier of voice-over-
Internet-protocol technology to telecom companies; Xirrus Inc., 
a provider of wireless networking equipment; and Tabula Inc., 
which makes semiconductors for electronic products.”79 It is 
readily apparent that a battery-powered cooler with a built-in 
radio (the aforementioned crowdfunded Cooler Cooler) is an 
entirely different sort of project than supplying B2B VoIP 
services. 
Second, the success rate of crowdfunding projects (as 
measured by their ability to raise funds) is much higher than 
the success rate of companies seeking VC funding. Crowds have 
already shown a strong preference for funding companies that 
are required to return all the funds if the companies do not 
meet an overall fundraising goal by raising money from a large 
number of people, whereas venture-capital firms generally 
invest solo or in small groups simultaneously. On Kickstarter, 
arguably the most popular non-equity crowdfunding platform 
with over $2 billion pledged to projects,80 companies must reach 
a pre-established fundraising goal before any money is released 
to the company.81 Even so, an incredible 44% of Kickstarter 
 
(Feb. 18, 2016), http://crowdfundingblog.com/most-successful-crowdfunding-
projects/. 
 78. Colleen Debaise & Scott Austin, The Top 50 Venture-Backed 
Companies, WALL ST J. (Mar. 10, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
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 79. Zoran Basich & Emily Maltby, Looking for the ‘Next Big Thing’? 
Ranking the Top 50 Startups, WALL ST J. (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/SB10000872396390444813104578018940187057924. 
 80. Stats, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/help/stats?ref= 
footer (last visited Aug. 13, 2016) (showing that through Kickstarter’s 
platform, over $2 billion has been pledged to various projects). 
 81. Funding, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/help/handbook/ 
funding (last visited Aug. 13, 2016) (explaining that Kickstarter will not 
release any money until the project’s goal has been reached); How Likely Is 
Your Crowdfunded Campaign to Succeed?, CAN. MEDIA FUND, http:// 
crowdfunding.cmf-fmc.ca/facts_and_stats/how-likely-is-your-crowdfunding-
campaign-to-succeed (last visited Aug. 13, 2016) (“Kickstarter campaigns, on 
the other hand, must reach their goal to receive any funds. This threshold 
requirement may also influence owners of Kickstarter campaigns to work 
harder to reach their objectives, or to set lower goals, as they will not receive 
  
2016] A PLACE OF THEIR OWN 161 
 
projects met their funding goal in 2013.82 Comparatively, only 
about 1.5% of venture-capital funding goes to seed-stage 
startups.83 While there is not any data directly showing how 
many companies looked for VC financing and failed to receive 
it, some commentators have calculated that about “99.93% of 
[startup companies] will never get VC.”84 
Additionally, there is a troubling gender gap in VC 
investment that is actually reversed within the crowdfunding 
context. Despite the fact that 36.3% of businesses in the United 
States are owned by women,85 women-led companies received 
only 7% of all the venture capital funding in the United 
States.86 In an empirical test, men who pitched to VCs received 
funding 60% more often than women did.87 In another 
experiment that offered investors the same pitch with a man’s 
voice and with a woman’s voice, 68% of investors preferred to 
fund the venture pitched by a man’s voice.88 In stark contrast, 
70% of women-led startups on the CircleUp Portal received 
funding, where only 58% of men-led startups received capital.89 
Crowdfunding thereby demonstrates its potential to 
“democratize startups.”90 
 
any funding unless they are ‘completely’ successful.”). 
 82. Robert Strohmeyer, The Crowdfunding Caveat: Most Campaigns Fail, 
PC WORLD (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2049399/the-
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(last visited Aug. 13, 2016). 
 83. 2014 MoneyTree Report, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS (Feb. 2016), 
https://www.pwcmoneytree.com/Reports/FullArchive/National_2014-4.pdf 
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Seeking Venture Capital, FORBES (July 22, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
dileeprao/2013/07/22/why-99-95-of-entrepreneurs-should-stop-wasting-time-
seeking-venture-capital/#12e54458296d (“[T]he probability of an average new 
business getting VC is about 0.0005 (300/600,000).”). 
 85. Fact Sheet: Women-Owned Businesses, NAT’L WOMEN’S BUS. COUNCIL 
(2012), https://www.nwbc.gov/sites/default/files/FS_Women-Owned_Businesses 
.pdf. 
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Are a Man, FASTCO DESIGN (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.fastcodesign.com/ 
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 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
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(Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.cnbc.com/2014/09/03/women-rule-when-it-comes-to-
crowdfunding.html. 
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Third, the failure rate of crowdfunded companies (as 
measured by their ability to deliver products as promised), is 
also much lower than the failure rate of venture-backed 
companies (as measured by their ability to return their 
investors’ capital). According to recent reports, “three-quarters 
of venture-backed firms in the U.S. don’t return investors’ 
capital.”91 The failure rate among angel-funded companies 
seems to be even higher: out of 100 average angel-funded 
companies, “two will eventually return just the capital that was 
originally invested, leaving only three as profitable exits.”92 
Meanwhile, Kickstarter reports that only 9% of successfully 
funded projects fail to deliver rewards to their backers.93 Other 
independent sources have put the overall crowdfunding failure-
to-timely-deliver rate at a much-higher 39%.94 In any event, the 
failure rate of crowdfunding projects to deliver on promises is 
remarkably lower than the failure rate of VC-funded companies 
to make a return on investment. 
It bears repeating that the data above regards non-equity 
crowdfunding. It is critical to re-evaluate these empirical 
studies when data on equity crowdfunding is available. Still, it 
is sensible to hypothesize that many of these above-mentioned 
non-equity crowdfunding trends will also be found in equity 
crowdfunding because these two fundraising modalities share 
so many observable characteristics. In any event, it is sufficient 
for the instant purposes of this Essay to demonstrate that 
crowdfunding and venture-capital investment are quite 
different, and therefore might be best understood as occurring 
in completely separate marketplaces. 
 
 91. Deborah Gage, The Venture Capital Secret: 3 out of 4 Startups  
Fail, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 20, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
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A. DUMB MONEY, WISE CROWDS 
None of the crowd-science theory of information 
aggregation and diffusion matters if there are no good 
investments available through crowdfunding. Professor 
Ibrahim argues that equity crowdfunding has a “market for 
lemons” problem.95 The classic example of a lemons market is 
the 1970s used car lot downtown. Buyers assume those cars are 
low quality, so the seller discounts them. But one cannot sell 
high quality products at discount prices, so the high-quality 
products exit the market, and only the “lemons” are left. 
Professor Ibrahim argues that dumb money may turn 
crowdfunding into a market for lemons. In response to 
Professor Ibrahim’s argument that crowdfunding is “dumb 
money,” see Part II of this Essay; see also Section (A)(2)(b)(ii) of 
his Article, which also acknowledges that crowds can be wise. 
But crowds are not necessarily wise, especially where 
regulations are imposed on them in ways that prevents 
networks from aggregating and disseminating information 
efficiently. 
Professor Ibrahim’s point that dumb money can ruin 
valuations in a shallow market should be taken quite seriously. 
As discussed above, policymakers appear not to fully 
understand the nature of crowds in terms of the systems and 
structures that best evidence their wisdom. If crowds cannot 
aggregate and diffuse valuable information about the true 
value of the companies who seek crowdfunding investments, 
then crowdfunding may fail. Therefore, policymakers should 
focus on making “smart regulations” that leverage the wisdom 
of crowds to prevent the “dumb money” problem. 
B. A DISTINCT MARKET FOR CROWDFUNDING 
Even if crowds are “dumb,” there are still reasons to 
believe the crowdfunding will not be a market for lemons, 
mainly because the crowdfunding market is in fact a different 
market that other investment markets. Professor Ibrahim’s 
core argument is that owners of good companies will not offer 
investment opportunities in such companies to Digital 
Shareholders because these “dumb money” investors will not be 
able to distinguish between good and bad companies. Digital 
Shareholders will not value good companies more than bad 
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companies, so owners of good companies will only seek capital 
form professional investors, who can appreciate their quality 
and will pay for it. Critically, this argument rests on the 
assumption that the properties which make a company “good” 
or “bad” are the same for Digital Shareholders and professional 
investors. But this is not the case. Crowdfunding is 
economically valuable precisely because it makes funding 
available to an entirely new genre of companies; namely, the 
companies that professional investors have long eschewed. 
In George Akerlof’s classic example of the lemons market 
for used automobiles, there are just four kinds of cars: new, 
good cars; new, bad cars; used, good cars; and used, bad cars.96 
In this schema, all car buyers want a “good” car. This 
simplification makes sense where most buyers can agree that a 
“good” car is one that is mechanically sound. But there is no 
such analogy to crowdfunding, where diverse Digital 
Shareholders have a multitude of reasons for investing in a 
particular company. 
Professionals such as VCs seek to maximize return on 
investment (ROI) of about 25% to 30% by investing in a 
portfolio of companies and monitoring them closely, expecting 
some to totally fail and others to return 20X the initial 
investment.97 VCs invest in:  
industries that are more competitively forgiving than the market as a 
whole. . . . In effect, venture capitalists focus on the middle part of the 
classic industry S-curve. They avoid both the early stages, when 
technologies are uncertain and market needs are unknown, and the 
later stages, when competitive shakeouts and consolidations are 
inevitable and growth rates slow dramatically.98 
Digital Shareholders seem to operate quite differently. 
They often choose to invest in local companies,99 women- or 
minority-owned companies,100 and companies that make 
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consumer products,101 even though few of these investments 
can ever achieve 20X returns. Web sites that facilitate these 
local investments (“Portals”) generally do not promise to 
“maximize returns,” but rather make more modest claims like 
“earn solid returns.”102 
The investment goals of Digital Shareholders may not be to 
earn 25% ROI over a 10-year term; rather, they may seek to 
foster local companies, support an underserved demographic, or 
to produce a consumer product they will enjoy owning. 
Therefore, equity crowdfunding may not have the severe 
information asymmetries of Professor Ibrahim’s concern.103 
Digital Shareholders can observe prior to investing whether a 
company is operated locally, owned or run by women, or 
produces an enticing consumer good. Portals can easily 
determine and convey such information. In fact, many state 
laws require Portals to confirm that online equity investment 
opportunities are in-state companies.104 
Returning to the classic Akerlof analogy, it now seems that 
equity crowdfunding is more like a market for new cars than 
for old ones, at least on the dimensions that are most relevant 
to Digital Shareholders’ investment decisions. A new-car buyer 
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can readily determine whether a model is a convertible or a 
sedan (even if it is “impossible for a buyer to tell the difference 
between a good and a bad [used] car”).105 Likewise, there is no 
information asymmetry regarding whether an investment 
opportunity is for a local brewery,106 a personal aircraft,107 or a 
mission to mars.108 If Digital Shareholders are more concerned 
with the nature of the company they fund than with the 
probably of making outsized returns, then equity crowdfunding 
is really a different market from venture-capital funding, and 
the lemons concern (where “good” companies seek VC 
investment and “bad” companies seek crowdfunding 
investment) is diminished. 
CONCLUSION 
This Essay suggests that equity crowdfunding could 
become an important part of the innovation economy if the 
regulatory systems are engineered properly. In prior work, I 
have pointed out numerous ways they are mis-engineered. 
Here, I hope to have made two new points: First, Internet 
crowds are as wise as we engineer the user experience to be. It 
follows that if crowds are regulated to be dumb, they will make 
dumb investment decisions. Therefore, the argument that we 
should protect crowdfunding investors via regulation must be 
evaluated through the crowd-science lens: we should only 
regulate crowd behavior where doing so clearly improves 
information aggregregation and does not cause information 
cascades. 
Second, Crowdfunding is not merely about making money. 
Crowdfunding provides a new model for the economy, emerging 
from our new capacity to stream the wisdom of crowds through 
Internet Portals to crowd-source investment decisions. This 
democratizes access to investment and encourages equity 
investments that are not based purely on the venture-capital 
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model of return on investment, opening up new possibilities for 
funding new catagories of companies and entrepreneurs. It is 
folly to evaluate crowdfunding purely with venture-capital 
metrics like return on investment. Crowdfunding systems 
should be evaluated by their capacity to reveal what people 
want and believe and by their ability to capitalize diverse 
entrepreneurs and ideas.  
